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          香港 or 美國在強化打擊洗錢與恐怖融資措施方面的進展情況。
          2020-09-15

          前言:香港公司開戶之難是這兩年企業的難題,不論你是有實力公司還是剛剛成立的小微企業,面對銀行開戶而提交繁多的材料多多少少都很抱怨,審批時間也很久,難道銀行也愿意這樣做嗎?有的客戶說,以前開戶很簡單,當天就可以拿到帳戶,而今日開戶如此之難,想也沒想到。以下真實案例就非常清晰說明了銀行為什么要對客戶的開戶資質審核如此之嚴了。

          圖片來源 / 圖蟲創意

          香港海關9月14日宣布,成功偵破一宗懷疑清洗黑錢案件,涉案金額超過30億港元,涉及金額為歷來海關處理同類型案件中最高。

          香港海關表示:

          已經拘捕六名年齡在25-62歲之間的人士,其中一名為本地找換店(外幣兌換店)的持牌人,其余五名為一家五口。

          香港海關有組織罪案調查科高級監督胡偉軍在記者會表示,該家庭成員包括父母以及三名子女,五人自2018年以來開設超過100個個人賬戶,參與約6000宗大宗交易,金額由數萬至數千萬港元不等。

          “兩名家庭成員無業,其余為找換店經理、技術員、客戶服務員等,平均月收入為1.5萬至3萬港元,家庭總收入約7萬港元,但卻擁有3000萬港元資產,包括1500萬存款以及兩個物業,市值分別為700萬港元及800萬港元,家庭財富狀況與收入嚴重不符?!?/p>

          據悉,海關進行了數月的調查,9月初搜查了4個住宅以及1家找換店,搜查出大量不同公司登記文件,已簽名的支票簿等。涉案家庭于2018年及今年年初在香港購買兩個物業,目前所有資產已被凍結。

          香港貿易管制處金錢服務監理科總貿易管制主任郭翠華透露:

          “調查顯示,過去兩年,上述家庭成員通過不同戶口處理多宗大額交易,資金來源來自不同公司或者不相關的第三者,大部分為空殼公司,經過不同戶口互相過戶后,在短時間內提走,以多次轉戶的方式掩飾資金來源,這是洗黑錢的慣常手法?!?/span>

          圖片來源 / 圖蟲創意

          根據香港《打擊洗錢及恐怖分子資金籌集條例》,洗黑錢屬于嚴重罪行,一經定罪,最高刑罰監禁14年,罰款500萬港元。

          同時,涉案的找換店利用未向海關登記的個人賬戶,進行大額交易串謀其他人洗黑錢,涉案的持牌找換店與該家庭今年的交易額達1.7億港元,但其向海關申報的交易額僅為3000萬港元。據了解,上述家庭的一個成員是該找換店經理,目前該找換店已被吊銷牌照。

          香港海關強調,一向嚴格執行金錢服務經營者的監理工作,對金錢服務經營者進行合規視察和調查。各持牌金錢服務經營者必須遵守相關的規定,違法者一經定罪,最高可被判罰款100萬港元及監禁7年。

          香港作為國際金融中心,具備低稅率、健全銀行服務及不設貨幣或外匯管制,每日均有來自全球各地的資金在市場進出。

          因此,不少跨境犯罪集團均會瞄準這個特性,利用香港獨特的金融環境,來掩藏及轉運他們的資金及犯罪收益,甚至把香港作為清洗黑錢的基地及“中轉站”,將犯罪款項“漂白”后匯出境外。

          胡偉軍表示,此次的資金流向懷疑與跨國犯罪有關,未來將與內地、海外執法機構,繼續追查資金最終目的地。

          Paris, 31 March 2020 - Since the 2016 assessment of the United States' measures to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing, the country has taken a number of actions to strengthen its framework.

          當地時間2020年3月31日,巴黎報道。自2016年互評估以來,美國采取了一系列行動來強化打擊洗錢和恐怖融資的框架。

          The United States has been in an enhanced follow-up process following the adoption of its mutual evaluation in 2016. In line with the FATF Procedures for mutual evaluations, the country has reported back to the FATF on the actions it has taken since then.

          美國自2016年互評估報告獲通過以來一直處在強化后續進程。根據金融行動特別工作組(FATF)的互評估程序,本次美國向FATF報告了過去幾年采取的行動。

          To reflect the United States' progress, the FATF has re-rated the country on the following Recommendation:

          FATF對以下技術合規性指標進行了重新評級,以反映美國的進展情況:

          l Recommendation 10 (Customer Due Diligence) - from Partially Compliant to Largely Compliant

          l 建議10(客戶盡職調查):從“部分合規”上調至“大致合規”

          The report also looks at whether the United States' measures meet the requirements of FATF Recommendations that have changed since the 2016 mutual evaluation. The FATF agreed to maintain the rating of Compliant for Recommendation 2 (National cooperation and coordination), Recommendation 5 (Terrorist financing offence) and Recommendation 21 (Tipping-off and confidentiality). The FATF also maintained the rating of Largely Compliant for Recommendation 7 (Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation), Recommendation 8 (Non-profit organisations), Recommendation 15 (New technologies) and Recommendation 18 (Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries).

          本報告還對美國的措施符合自2016年互評估以來發生過調整的FATF建議新要求的情況進行了考察。FATF同意維持對建議2(國家層面合作與協調)、建議5(恐怖融資犯罪)和建議21(泄密和保密)的“合規”評級,以及對建議7(擴散相關定向金融制裁)、建議8(非營利組織)、建議15(新技術)和建議18(內部控制、境外分支機構和附屬機構)的“大致合規”評級。

          The United States is now compliant on 9 of the 40 Recommendations and largely compliant on 22 of them. It remains partially compliant on 5 of the 40 Recommendations and not compliant on 4 of them. The United States remains in enhanced follow-up and will report back to the FATF on progress to strengthen its implementation of Anti-Money Laundering / Countering the Financing of Terrorism measures.

          目前美國的40項技術合規性指標中有9個“合規”、22個“大致合規”、5個“部分合規”和4個“不合規”。美國仍被列在強化后續進程,并將繼續向FATF報告在強化反洗錢和反恐怖融資措施執行方面的進展情況。

          UNITED STATES: 3rd ENHANCED FOLLOW-UP REPORT

          美國第四輪互評估第三份強化后續報告

          1. INTRODUCTION

          一、概述

          The mutual evaluation report (MER) of the U.S. was adopted in October 2016. The U.S. did not request technical compliance re-ratings during its 1st or 2nd follow-up reports. This follow-up report analyses the U.S.’ progress in addressing certain technical compliance deficiencies which were identified in its MER. Re-rating is given where sufficient progress has been made (Recommendation 10). This report also analyses the U.S.’ progress in implementing new requirements relating to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations which have changed since the end of the on-site visit to the U.S. in February 2016: Recommendations 2, 5, 7, 8, 15, 18 and 21. This report does not address what progress the U.S. has made to improve its effectiveness. A later follow-up assessment will analyse progress on improving effectiveness which may result in re-ratings of Immediate Outcomes at that time.

          FATF于2016年10月通過了美國的第四輪互評估報告(MER)。在前兩份后續報告中,美國未提出對技術合規性指標進行重新評級的要求。本次發布的后續報告分析了美國在解決互評估報告中指出的某些技術合規性缺陷方面的進展情況。改進充分的指標(建議10)被給予了重新評級。本報告還分析了美國在執行自2016年2月現場評估結束以來發生過調整的FATF建議(建議2、5、7、8、15、18和21)新要求方面的進展情況。本報告未對美國在改進有效性指標方面取得的進展進行評價,相關內容將被安排在下次后續再評估,屆時將決定是否對直接目標(IO)進行重新評級。

          2. FINDINGS OF THE MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT

          二、互評估報告的發現

          The MER rated the U.S. as follows for technical compliance:

          Given these results, the FATF placed the U.S. in enhanced follow-up. The following experts assessed the U.S.’ request for technical compliance re-ratings:

          鑒于40項技術合規性指標中有10個“部分合規”或“不合規”,并且核心指標中有2個“部分合規”或“不合規”,FATF將美國列入強化后續進程。本次,根據美國要求對技術合規性指標進行重新評級的申請,以下專家實施了再評估:

          l Mr. Alvin Koh, Deputy Director & Specialist Leader, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Singapore, and

          l 新加坡金管局(MAS)副主任兼專家組組長Alvin Koh先生;

          l Mr. Bill Peoples, Legal Services, New Zealand Police, New Zealand.

          l 新西蘭警察局法務處Bill Peoples先生。

          Section 3 of this report summarises the U.S.’ progress made in improving technical compliance. Section 4 sets out the conclusion and a table showing which Recommendation has been re-rated.

          本報告第三節對美國在改進技術合規性方面取得的進展做了概述。第四節給出了結論及重新評級結果。

          3. OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS TO IMPROVE TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE

          三、在改進技術合規性方面的進展情況概述

          This section summarises the U.S.’ progress to improve its technical compliance by:

          本節對美國在改進技術合規性方面的進展情況做了概述,包括:

          l a) Addressing certain technical compliance deficiencies identified in the MER, and

          l ⑴解決互評估報告中指出的技術合規性缺陷的情況;

          l b) Implementing new requirements where the FATF Recommendations have changed since the on-site visit to the US (Recommendations 2, 5, 7, 8, 15, 18 and 21).

          l ⑵執行自現場評估結束以來發生過調整的FATF建議(建議2、5、7、8、15、18和21)新要求的情況。

          3.1. Progress to address technical compliance deficiencies identified in the MER

          1、在解決互評估報告中指出的技術合規性缺陷方面的進展情況

          The U.S. has made progress to address the technical compliance deficiencies identified in the MER in relation to Recommendation 10. As a result of this progress, the U.S. has been re-rated on this Recommendation.

          美國在解決互評估報告中指出的涉及建議10的技術合規性缺陷方面取得了進展。因改進充分,該項指標被重新評級。

          Recommendation 10 (originally rated PC)

          建議10 客戶盡職調查(原被評為“部分合規”)

          In its 4th round MER, the U.S was rated PC with R.10 based on the following deficiencies: lack of customer due diligence (CDD) requirements to ascertain and verify the identity of beneficial owners (BO), which was a significant shortcoming; investment advisers (IAs) were not directly covered by Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) obligations (some IAs were indirectly covered through affiliations with banks, bank holding companies and broker-dealers); financial institutions other than in the securities and derivatives sectors were not explicitly required to identify and verify the identity of persons authorised to act on behalf of customers, and some FIs were not explicitly required to understand and obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. FIs were not required to understand the ownership and control structure of customers that are legal persons/arrangements.

          在第四輪互評估報告中,美國在建議10上被評為“部分合規”,缺陷包括:缺乏關于確定與核實受益所有人(BO)身份的客戶盡職調查(CDD)要求(重大缺陷);未將投資顧問(IA)直接納入《銀行保密法》(BSA)規定的義務主體范圍(盡管某些投資顧問因為與銀行、銀行控股公司和經紀自營商的關系被間接納入義務主體范圍);未明確要求除證券和衍生品行業外的金融機構識別與核實授權代表客戶行事的個人或實體的身份,也未明確要求某些金融機構了解業務關系的目的和預期性質并獲取相關信息。未要求金融機構了解法人和法律安排的所有權和控制結構。

          As of May 2018, 31 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 1010.230 (Beneficial ownership requirements for legal entity customers) requires covered financial institutions to establish and maintain written procedures that are reasonably designed to identify and verify beneficial owners of legal entity customers and to include such procedures in their anti-money laundering (AML) compliance program. The requirements to identify and verify BO, as applied to legal persons (such as corporations and limited liability companies), is clear with respect to both its ownership threshold and its control element. It is however not explicit as regard all type of legal arrangements, but would cover legal arrangements (such as trust) which are required to be registered by certain state authorities - such legal arrangements are considered legal entities and hence covered.

          截至2018年5月,《美國聯邦法規》第31編第1010節第230條(法人客戶的受益所有權要求)要求納入義務主體范圍的金融機構建立和維護設計合理的書面程序以識別與核實法人客戶的受益所有人,并將此類程序納入反洗錢合規計劃。適用于法人(如股份有限公司和有限責任公司)的識別與核實受益所有人的要求在持股比例和控制要素兩方面都很明確。然而,除對某些被視為法律實體而要求在國家主管部門注冊的法律安排(如信托)進行明確外,上述規定未對所有類型法律安排進行明確。

          In addition, the U.S. has introduced ongoing CDD requirements for FIs, which included the need to have appropriate risk-based procedures on understanding the nature and purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a customer risk profile, and ongoing monitoring of the customer relationship to identify and report suspicious transactions and, on a risk basis, to maintain and update customer information.

          此外,美國對金融機構提出了持續的客戶盡職調查要求,包括應當建立適當的風險為本程序以了解客戶關系的性質和目的從而確定客戶風險狀況,以及持續監控客戶關系以識別和報告可疑交易,并在風險基礎上維護和更新客戶信息。

          However, a few minor technical gaps remain, including the lack of explicit BO requirements, mainly in relation to other trust relevant parties for legal arrangements. Limited measures have been taken to improve the occasional transaction threshold of USD 3 000 for Money Services Business (MSBs) and to improve gaps with regard to life insurance companies. In addition, IAs are still not directly covered by BSA obligations.

          然而,仍有一些小的技術差距,包括缺乏明確的受益所有人要求,這主要涉及法律安排的其他信托相關方。在提高貨幣服務企業(MSB)的客戶盡職調查起點金額(一次性交易3000美元以上)及縮小壽險公司的差距方面采取的措施很有限。此外,仍未將投資顧問直接納入《銀行保密法》規定的義務主體范圍。

          Overall, the U.S. has addressed a number of the key identified deficiencies, but deficiencies (especially in relation to all types of legal arrangements) still remain. The U.S. is therefore re-rated as Largely Compliant with R.10.

          總的來說,盡管仍有其他缺陷(特別是涉及所有類型法律安排的缺陷),但美國確實解決了一系列關鍵缺陷。因此,美國在建議10上被重新評級為“大致合規”。

          3.2. Progress on Recommendations which have changed since the adoption of the MER

          2、在執行自互評估報告獲通過以來發生過調整的FATF建議新要求方面的進展情況

          Since the U.S. 4th round MER on-site visit, the FATF has amended Recommendations 2, 5, 7, 8, 15, 18 and 21. This section considers the U.S.’ compliance with the new requirements, and its progress to address the technical compliance deficiencies identified in the MER in relation to these Recommendations.

          自美國第四輪互評估報告現場評估結束以來,FATF對建議2、5、7、8、15、18和21進行了修訂。本節對美國遵守新要求的情況及在解決互評估報告中指出的涉及上述建議的技術合規性缺陷方面的進展情況進行了考察。

          Recommendation 2 (originally rated C)

          建議2 國家層面合作與協調(原被評為“合規”)

          In October 2018, R.2 was amended to require countries to have cooperation and coordination between relevant authorities to ensure compatibility of AML and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) requirements with Data Protection and Privacy rules. The amended Recommendation further requires a domestic mechanism for exchange of information. In its 4th round MER, the U.S. was rated C with R.2.

          2018年10月,FATF對建議2進行了修訂,要求各國在相關主管部門之間進行合作與協調,以確保反洗錢和反恐怖融資要求與數據保護和隱私規則相兼容。修訂后的建議進一步要求建立國內信息交流機制。在第四輪互評估報告中,美國在建議2上被評為“合規”。

          The U.S. complies with the revised requirements of R.2. Domestic coordination and cooperation, including exchange of information domestically concerning the development and implementation of AML/CFT policies and activities, were considered in the U.S. 4th round MER to be an overall strength of the U.S. system. In addition, the publication of the first National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing in 2018 further affirms the ability of various agencies in the U.S. to coordinate and exchange information.

          美國符合修訂后的建議2要求。美國第四輪互評估報告認為,包括國內關于制定和執行反洗錢和反恐怖融資政策和活動的信息交流在內的國內協調與合作是美國反洗錢和反恐怖融資體系整體實力的體現。此外,2018年發布的首份《打擊恐怖主義和其他非法金融國家戰略》進一步肯定了美國各類監管機構協調和信息交流的能力。

          The U.S. does not have a central data protection authority, nor a privacy regime that conceives the protection of privacy as a fundamental right in all circumstances. While there are various statues that protect financial data, these do not inhibit the implementation of AML/CFT measures or requirements (see criterion 9.1 of the U.S. 4th round MER). In addition, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC) coordinates with a number of authorities to ensure privacy and other restrictions do not unduly hinder the dissemination of information for AML/CFT purposes.

          美國沒有中央數據保護主管部門,也沒有在任何情況下都將隱私保護視為基本權利的隱私制度。盡管有各種保護金融數據的法規,但這些法規并不妨礙反洗錢和反恐怖融資措施或要求的執行(參見美國第四輪互評估報告評審標準9.1)。此外,美國財政部恐怖融資和金融犯罪辦公室(TFFC)與一系列主管部門進行了協調,以確保隱私和其他限制不會不適當地妨礙反洗錢和反恐怖融資信息的移送。

          The revised and new criteria have both been met. The U.S. therefore remains rated Compliant with R.2.

          美國符合修訂后的及新增的評審標準。因此,美國在建議2上被維持在“合規”。

          Recommendation 5 (originally rated C)

          建議5 恐怖融資犯罪(原被評為“合規”)

          In February 2016, a new obligation was added to R.5, requiring countries to criminalise the financing of foreign terrorist fighters.

          2016年2月,FATF在建議5項下增加了一項新的義務,要求各國將資助外國恐怖主義戰斗人員(FTF)的行為定為犯罪。

          The U.S. federal criminal terrorist financing (TF) offences are broad enough to cover this aspect, since the time of the U.S. 4th round MER. Operation Rhino, for example, described in paragraph 193 of the MER, provided an example of an enforcement action involving individuals travelling abroad and included an enforcement response against individuals who facilitated travel. Facilitation includes financing the travel of individuals to another country.

          自第四輪互評估報告獲通過以來,美國聯邦恐怖融資(TF)犯罪的范圍廣泛到足以涵蓋該義務。例如,根據互評估報告第193段所述,犀牛行動提供了一個關于個人出國加入恐怖組織的強制措施的示例,其中包括應對個人為出國提供資金等便利的強制措施。

          In addition, several cases were pursued against foreign terrorist fighters and attempted supporters subsequent to the MER, which confirm the existing TF offences are broad enough.The U.S. therefore remains rated Compliant with R.5.

          此外,自互評估報告獲通過以來,美國追查了若干起針對外國恐怖主義戰斗人員和未遂支持者的案件,這些案件證實了現有恐怖融資犯罪的范圍足夠廣泛。因此,美國在建議5上被維持在“合規”。

          Recommendation 7 (originally rated LC)

          建議7 擴散相關定向金融制裁(原被評為“大致合規”)

          In November 2017, R.7 was amended to reflect changes to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) on proliferation financing since the FATF standards were issued in February 2012.

          2017年11月,FATF對建議7進行了修訂,以反映自2012年2月FATF標準發布以來聯合國安理會(UNSC)關于擴散融資決議的調整情況。

          In its 4th round MER, the U.S. was rated LC with R.7. The deficiency was in relation to the fact that the U.S. had applied targeted financial sanctions (TFS) without delay to most, but not all persons designated by the UN pursuant to UNSCRs 1718 and 1737, which was a minor deficiency as the US implemented 90% (138 of the 154) of the UN Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-related and Iran-related listings without delay (within a matter of hours).

          在第四輪互評估報告中,美國在建議7上被評為“大致合規”。小缺陷在于,美國毫不遲延地對根據聯合國安理會第1718號和第1737號決議列名的大多數而不是所有個人或實體實施了定向金融制裁,例如美國毫不遲延地(在幾個小時內)執行了聯合國朝鮮和伊朗相關名單中的90%(154個中的138個)。

          The U.S. implements UN TFS through a combination of legal authorities that are codified in the regulations of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control. These are: the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. Part 544, which implements Executive Order 13382), the North Korea Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. 510), the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. part 560), the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. part 561), and the Iranian Human Rights Abuses Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. part 562).

          美國通過財政部海外資產控制辦公室(OFAC)條例中編纂的法律權力組合來執行聯合國定向金融制裁,包括:《大規模殺傷性武器(WMD)擴散者制裁條例》(《美國聯邦法規》第31編第544部分、該條例對第13382號行政令進行補充)、《朝鮮制裁條例》(《美國聯邦法規》第31編第510節)、《伊朗交易和制裁條例》(《美國聯邦法規》第31編第560部分)、《伊朗金融制裁條例》(《美國聯邦法規》第31編第561部分)及《伊朗人權侵犯制裁條例》(《美國聯邦法規》第31編第562部分)。

          On DPRK, UNSCRs 1718 and 1874 have been implemented and the U.S. issued press releases relevant to the listings in UNSCRs 2087, 2094, 2270, and 2321. The press releases accompany most U.S. designations. Whenever a UN listing is not reflected in the press release, it is because that individual or entity was already listed by the authorities. On Iran, for the purposes of R.7, UNSCR 2231 terminated several previous UNSCRs relating to Iran and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, but no individual or entity that has been added to the UNSCR 2231 list since it was created (hence no specific release needed).

          關于朝鮮,美國執行了聯合國安理會第1718號和1874號決議,并發布了第2087號、2094號、2270號和2321號決議所列名單相關新聞稿。大多數美國列名的個人或實體附有新聞稿。如新聞稿中未提及聯合國名單,那意味著該個人或實體已被主管部門列入本國名單。關于伊朗,出于定向金融制裁需要,聯合國安理會第2231號決議終止了先前幾個關于伊朗和大規模殺傷性武器擴散的決議,但自該決議發布以來,無任何個人或實體被列入決議名單(因此無需發布具體新聞稿)。

          However, the deficiency in its 4th round MER has not been fully addressed. The U.S. has implemented around 93% (versus 90% at time of MER) of the total UN Proliferation Financing (PF)-related listings, but has still not covered all of the persons/entities designated by the PF-related UNSCRs.

          然而,第四輪互評估報告中指出的缺陷尚未得到完全解決。盡管美國執行了聯合國擴散融資(PF)相關名單總量的約93%(互評估報告發布時為90%),但仍未涵蓋擴散融資相關決議列名的所有個人或實體。

          On this basis, the U.S. remains rated Largely Compliant with R.7.

          因此,美國在建議7上被維持在“大致合規”。

          Recommendation 8 (originally rated LC)

          建議8 非營利組織(原被評為“大致合規”)

          In June 2016, R.8 and its Interpretive Note were substantially revised, and the assessment of R.8 in the MER therefore needed to be reviewed.

          2016年6月,FATF對建議8及其釋義進行了實質性修訂,因此需要對互評估報告中建議8的評估進行審查。

          In its 4th round MER, the U.S. was rated LC with R.8, based on a minor deficiency in relation to the fact that houses of worships were exempt from the requirement of applying to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for recognition of their tax-exemption status.

          在第四輪互評估報告中,美國在建議8上被評為“大致合規”。小缺陷在于,宗教場所無需向國稅局(IRS)申請即可享受免稅。

          The 2018 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment deals extensively with charitable organisations and the risk of TF abuse in line with the required by the revisions to R.8. The U.S. has regulatory and administrative mechanisms, described in its 4th round MER, that promote accountability and integrity in the management of non-profit organisations (NPOs). In addition, the IRS monitors compliance of NPOs with the U.S. tax laws and can conduct criminal investigations as necessary. Sanctions applied are proportionate and dissuasive in case of violation of requirements.

          根據修訂后的建議8要求,《2018年國家恐怖融資風險評估報告》廣泛涉及慈善組織和被濫用于恐怖融資的風險。根據第四輪互評估報告所述,美國的監管和行政機制能夠促進非營利組織(NPO)管理的問責制和誠信。此外,國稅局對非營利組織遵守美國稅法的情況進行監控,并在必要時進行刑事調查。對違規行為采取的處罰措施是相稱和有勸誡性的。

          Moreover, there are mechanisms to ensure effective cooperation, coordination and information sharing on TF issues, including as regards NPOs. There are multiple mechanisms to promptly share information regarding suspected terrorist abuse.

          此外,還有一些機制能夠確保在包括非營利組織在內的恐怖融資問題上進行有效的合作、協調與信息共享。有多種機制可迅速共享關于疑似被恐怖分子濫用的信息。

          However, the minor deficiency identified in the 4th round MER remains, as houses of worships are still exempt from the requirements of applying to the IRS for recognition of their tax-exemption status.

          然而,第四輪互評估報告中發現的小缺陷仍存在,宗教場所仍無需向國稅局申請即可享受免稅。

          On this basis, the U.S. remains rated Largely Compliant with R.8.

          因此,美國在建議8上被維持在“大致合規”。

          Recommendation 15 (originally rated LC)

          建議15 新技術(原被評為“大致合規”)

          In October 2019, revisions were made to methodology for assessing R.15, to reflect amendments to the FATF Standards incorporating virtual assets (VA) and virtual asset service providers (VASP).

          2019年10月,FATF對建議15的評估方法進行了修訂,以反映FATF標準對虛擬資產(VA)和虛擬資產服務提供商(VASP)的修訂。

          In its 4th round MER, the U.S. was rated LC with R.15, based on minor deficiencies, including that not all IAs were covered and there were no explicit requirements for FIs to address the risks presented by new technologies.

          在第四輪互評估報告中,美國在建議15上被評為“大致合規”。小缺陷在于,未將所有投資顧問納入義務主體范圍,也未明確要求金融機構應對新技術帶來的風險。

          The U.S. has met or mostly met most of the new criteria of R.15, through the following actions, although minor deficiencies, such as coverage of IAs, remain:

          盡管仍有小缺陷(如未將所有投資顧問納入義務主體范圍),但美國通過以下行動達到或基本達到了建議15的大多數新增的評審標準:

          l U.S. authorities understand and are aware of the ML/TF risks emerging from virtual assets. Aside from various taskforce and working groups set up to consider the risks, their risk understanding is also reflected in their 2018 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment and National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment, as well as the 2018 National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing.

          l 美國主管部門理解并意識到虛擬資產帶來的洗錢和恐怖融資風險。除成立各種特別行動組和工作組來審查風險外,他們對風險的理解也反映在《2018年國家洗錢風險評估報告》、《2018年國家恐怖融資風險評估報告》及《2018年打擊恐怖主義和其他非法金融國家戰略》中。

          l The combination of the various U.S. legislation would cover the five classes of VASPs as defined by the FATF, but it does not explicitly include all VASPs that is solely incorporated the U.S. (i.e. a VASP which does not perform any activity relating to U.S. persons, or a U.S.’ nexus).

          l 美國的各種法規組合可涵蓋FATF定義的五類虛擬資產服務提供商,但未明確包括所有僅在美國注冊的虛擬資產服務提供商(即該虛擬資產服務提供商不從事任何涉及美國人士或美國關系的活動)。

          l Most convertible virtual currencies (CVC) exchangers, administrators and other similar entities are regulated as money transmitters (or MSBs) under the BSA and have to implement AML/CFT programs as MSBs. Such MSBs have to develop, implement and maintain an effective AML program and the program shall be commensurate with the risks posed by the location, size, nature and volume of the financial services provided by the MSBs. Further, banks and persons registered with, and functionally regulated or examined by, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), that engage in transactions denominated in value that substitutes for currency will be subject to BSA regulations according to the applicable section of 31 CFR Chapter X. However, the CDD threshold for occasional transactions for MSBs is USD 3 000 (as opposed to USD 1 000 required in the FATF Standards) and this higher threshold is not clearly supported by low ML/TF risks.

          l 按照《銀行保密法》,大多數可兌換虛擬貨幣(CVC)交易商、發行方和其他類似實體被當作匯款公司(或貨幣服務企業)進行監管,必須像貨幣服務企業那樣執行反洗錢和反恐怖融資計劃。此類貨幣服務企業必須制定、執行和維護有效反洗錢計劃,該計劃應當與貨幣服務企業提供金融服務的地點、規模、性質和數量所構成的風險相稱。此外,對根據《美國聯邦法規》第31編第10章的適用條款在證監會(SEC)和商品期貨交易委員會(CFTC)注冊并受其監管或檢查的銀行和其他個人或實體,如其從事的交易以替代貨幣的價值計量,則應當遵守《銀行保密法》的規定。然而,貨幣服務企業辦理一次性交易的客戶盡職調查起點金額為3000美元(而不是FATF標準要求的1000美元),卻并沒有明顯證據表明該領域的洗錢和恐怖融資風險較低。

          l MSBs must register with FinCEN and renew every two years. MSBs have to be licensed at the state level, and background checks are conducted at the state level prior to the issuing of licenses. CVC providers examined by SEC or CFTC are also subject to fit and proper checks.

          l 貨幣服務企業必須在金融犯罪執法網絡(FinCEN)注冊并每兩年更新一次。貨幣服務企業必須在州一級獲得許可,并在頒發許可證之前進行背景調查。受證監會或商品期貨交易委員會檢查的可兌換虛擬貨幣提供商同樣要接受適當的調查。

          l In general, FinCEN, SEC, and CFTC are able to apply a range of proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance, including for CVCs that are unlicensed or not-registered. The U.S. authorities have, even prior to the revisions made to R.15, also taken actions against CVCs providers for operating as an unlicensed money transmitting business (e.g. U.S. vs E-Gold and Liberty Reserve).

          l 總的來說,FinCEN、證監會和商品期貨交易委員會能夠對包括無證經營可兌換虛擬貨幣在內的違規行為采取一系列相稱和有勸誡性的處罰措施。即使是在FATF對建議15進行修訂之前,美國主管部門也對無證經營的可兌換虛擬貨幣提供商采取了行動(如美國訴“電子黃金”和“自由儲備”案)。

          l Since 2014, IRS and FinCEN have conducted examinations of various CVC providers, including administrators, some of the largest exchangers by volume (a key vulnerability assessed by the U.S. authorities in this space), individual peer-to-peer exchangers, etc. The U.S.’ strategy is to inspect all covered financial institutions but does not specifically identify higher risk VASPs, as they are largely covered under the broader MSB regime. Therefore, it is not entirely clear whether the current approach is sufficiently risk focused, especially since only 30% of all registered CVC providers have been inspected since 2014.

          l 自2014年以來,國稅局和FinCEN對包括發行方、交易量最大的一些交易商(美國主管部門在該領域評估的一個關鍵漏洞)、個人點對點交易商等在內的各類可兌換虛擬貨幣提供商進行了檢查。美國的戰略是檢查所有納入義務主體范圍的金融機構,但未對風險較高的虛擬資產服務提供商作出具體規定,而它們大部分被涵蓋在更廣泛的貨幣服務企業制度項下。因此,尚不完全清楚目前的方法是否足夠風險為本,特別是自2014年以來,所有注冊的可兌換虛擬貨幣服務提供商中只有30%接受過檢查。

          l FinCEN, SEC and CFTC have published a range of guidance over the years. In particular, FinCEN’s Guidance issued in May 2019 provides a good overview of the existing regime and regulatory expectations with regard to CVC providers in the U.S.

          l 過去幾年,FinCEN、證監會和商品期貨交易委員會發布了一系列指引。特別是FinCEN于2019年5月發布的指引很好地概述了美國可兌換虛擬貨幣提供商的現行制度和監管期望。

          l With regard to mutual legal assistance and international cooperation, the U.S. was rated LC for R.37, R.38, and R.39, and C for R.40 in its 4th round MER, due mainly to concerns relating to application of dual criminality requirements. Financial supervisors (such as SEC, CFTC and FinCEN) have a legal basis for providing cooperation with their foreign counterparts (regardless of their respective nature or status), in particular with respect to the exchange of supervisory information related to or relevant for AML/CFT purposes. However, given the overall treatment of U.S. authorities of CVC as a form of assets, which can be subject to seizure and confiscation, the gaps are the same with those identified in the 4th round MER.

          l 就司法協助(MLA)和國際合作而言,在第四輪互評估報告中,美國在建議37、38和39上被評為“大致合規”,在建議40上被評為“合規”,主要問題在于對雙重犯罪要求的適用。金融監管機構(如證監會、商品期貨交易委員會和FinCEN)具備與外國同行合作的法律依據(無論其性質或地位如何),特別是在反洗錢和反恐怖融資相關監管信息交流方面。然而,考慮到美國主管部門將可兌換虛擬貨幣視為一種可扣押和沒收的資產形式,第四輪互評估報告中指出的差距并未縮小。

          On this basis, the U.S. remains rated as Largely Compliant with R.15.

          因此,美國在建議15上被維持在“大致合規”。

          Recommendation 18 (originally rated LC)

          建議18 內部控制、境外分支機構和附屬機構(原被評為“大致合規”)

          In February 2018, R.18 was amended to reflect the November 2017 amendments to the FATF Standards (interpretive note 18), which clarified the requirements on sharing of information and analyses related to unusual or suspicious transactions within financial groups, and the interaction of these requirements with tipping-off provisions.

          2018年2月,FATF對建議18進行了修訂,以反映2017年11月對FATF標準(釋義18)的修訂,后者澄清了金融集團內部異?;蚩梢山灰紫嚓P信息共享和分析的要求,以及這些要求與泄密條款的相互作用。

          In its 4th round MER, the U.S. was rated LC with R.18, based on minor deficiencies that not all IAs were covered and there was no explicit obligation to inform the home supervisors if the host country did not permit proper implementation of AML/CFT measures.

          在第四輪互評估報告中,美國在建議18上被評為“大致合規”,小缺陷在于,未將所有投資顧問納入義務主體范圍,并且在東道國禁止有效執行反洗錢和反恐怖融資措施時也無明確義務通知本國監管機構。

          The revised standard is met. There are no specific prohibitions preventing covered financial institutions from sharing customer information within the financial group. In 2006, FinCEN issued guidance permitting banks, securities and futures firms to share SARs as well as information underlying SARs (subject to certain exceptions and qualifications) with parent entities, both within and outside of the U.S. In 2014, FinCEN also highlighted in an Advisory that information should be shared throughout the organization (which would include multiple affiliated institutions) and that there is information in various departments within a financial institution that may be useful and should be shared with the compliance staff. The 31 U.S.C. § 5318 also contains a general prohibition on tipping off.

          美國符合修訂后的標準。沒有具體禁令禁止納入義務主體范圍的金融機構在金融集團內部共享客戶信息。2006年,FinCEN發布指引,允許銀行、證券和期貨公司與美國境內外的母公司共享可疑活動報告(SAR)及相關信息(受某些例外和條件限制)。2014年,FinCEN還在一份建議中強調,信息應當在整個組織(包括多個附屬機構)內共享,金融機構內部各個部門可能有用的信息應當與合規人員共享?!睹绹ǖ洹返?1編第5318節也包含一項關于泄密的一般禁令。

          However, the deficiencies identified in its 4th round MER relating to coverage of IAs and obligation to inform the home supervisors, if the host country does not permit proper implementation of AML/CFT measures, still remain.

          然而,在第四輪互評估報告中指出的關于未將所有投資顧問納入義務主體范圍及在東道國禁止有效執行反洗錢和反恐怖融資措施時無明確義務通知本國監管機構的缺陷仍存在。

          On this basis, the U.S. remains rated as Largely Compliant with R.18.

          因此,美國在建議18上被維持在“大致合規”。

          Recommendation 21 (originally rated C)

          建議21 泄密和保密(原被評為“合規”)

          In February 2018, R.21 was amended to clarify that anti-tipping-off provisions are not intended to inhibit information sharing under R.18. In its 4th round MER, the U.S. was rated C on R.21.

          2018年2月,FATF對建議21進行了修訂,以澄清反泄密條款并非旨在禁止建議18項下的信息共享。在第四輪互評估報告中,美國在建議21上被評為“合規”。

          The revised standard remains met. Pursuant to 31 C.F.R. 1020.320(e), the provisions of prohibiting financial institutions and their directors, officers and employees from disclosing the fact that an SAR or related information is being filed shall not be construed as prohibiting the sharing of an SAR or any information related to the SAR.

          美國仍符合修訂后的標準。根據《美國聯邦法規》第31編第1020節第320條第(e)款,不得將禁止金融機構及其董事、高級管理人員和員工披露可疑活動報告或相關信息報送情況的規定解釋為禁止共享可疑活動報告或任何相關信息。

          The U.S. therefore remains rated as Compliant with R.21.

          因此,美國在建議21上被維持在“合規”。

          3.3. Brief overview on other Recommendations rated PC/NC

          3、其他被評為“部分合規”或“不合規”指標的簡要概述

          The U.S. has reported progress on other Recommendations rated PC/NC, such as R.1, R.12, R.16, R.20, R.24, R.25 and R.28. Actions underway include, among others, undertaking a systemic review of its AML/CFT system to more effectively address identified risks, including with respect to some sectors currently uncovered.

          美國報告了其他被評為“部分合規”或“不合規”指標(如建議1、12、16、20、24、25和28)的進展情況。正在采取的行動包括對反洗錢和反恐怖融資體系進行系統性審查以更有效應對風險,包括目前尚未發現的某些行業的風險。

          CONCLUSION

          結論

          The U.S. has made progress to address the technical compliance deficiencies identified in the MER and has been upgraded on Recommendation 10. After the technical compliance re-rating, five Recommendations remain PC and four Recommendations remain NC.

          美國在解決互評估報告中指出的技術合規性缺陷方面取得了進展,并在建議10上被上調了評級。重新評級后,5項指標被維持在“部分合規”,4項指標被維持在“不合規”。

          Technical compliance with the FATF Recommendations has been re-rated as follows:

          技術合規性指標被重新評級為:

          Table 2. Technical compliance with re-ratings, February 2020

          The U.S. will remain in enhanced follow-up on the basis that it has nine Recommendations remaining rated PC/NC for technical compliance, and three Immediate Outcomes remaining rated ME/LE for effectiveness. In accordance with the FATF Procedures, the U.S. will report back to the FATF on progress to strengthen its implementation of AML/CFT measures.

          鑒于9項技術合規性指標被維持在“部分合規”或“不合規”,以及3項有效性指標被維持在“中等有效”或“低效”,美國仍將被列在強化后續進程。根據FATF的程序,美國將繼續向FATF報告在強化反洗錢和反恐怖融資措施執行方面的進展情況。


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